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This paper develops a stylized model of cross-border balancing. We distinguish
three degrees of cooperation: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. The
model shows that TSO cooperation reduces costs. The gains of cooperation increase
with cost asymmetry and decrease with correlation of real-time imbalances. Based
on actual market data of reserves procurement of positive and negative automatic
frequency restoration reserves in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain, we estimate the procurement cost decrease of exchange to be e160
million per year and of sharing to be e500 million per year. The model also shows
that voluntary cross-border cooperation could be hard to achieve, as TSOs do not
necessarily have correct incentives.
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1 Introduction
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are responsible for the security of their
transmission system. They use upward and downward reserves to deal with imbal-
ances, caused by unanticipated outages and forecast errors of demand and intermit-
tent supply. Historically, each TSO procured and activated its reserves in its own
zone. However – following cooperation in forward markets, the day-ahead market
and the intraday market – some TSOs in Europe and the United States recently
started cross-border cooperation of reserves.
The benefits of cross-border cooperation of reserves have already been studied
in the literature. Most of the literature presents case study results. Vandezande
et al. (2009) estimate that a Belgium-Netherlands balancing market would have
decreased procurement and activation costs by 29-44% in 2008, depending on the
availability of cross-border capacity. Likewise, Van den Bergh et al. (2017) estimate
the benefits of cross-border activation of reserves to be around e25 million a year
for a case study of the 2013 Central Western European electricity system (Belgium,
France, Germany and the Netherlands). However, they find lower benefits of coop-
eration if transmission constraints are neglected during cross-border procurement.
Farahmand et al. (2012) study the integration of the balancing and procurement
markets of Northern Europe, Germany and the Netherlands. They estimate savings
of approximately e204 million per year for exchange of balancing energy and e153
million per year for exchange of reserve capacity. This last number is in line with
our estimation of e160 million per year for exchange between Belgium, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Gebrekiros et al. (2013) find only
*Corresponding author: Ewa Lazarczyk Carlson, Email: ewalazarczyk@ru.is
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a reduction of 2% of procurement costs in a small numerical illustration. van der
Weijde and Hobbs (2011) quantify the inter-market benefits using a stylised 4-node
network. They find that the benefits of coordinating balancing markets generally
exceed unit commitment benefits. In a future with a 45% penetration of renewable
generation, Mott MacDonald (2013) estimates operational cost savings of exchange
and sharing of reserves on European scale in the order of e3 billion a year. They as-
sume that the increased intermittent and unpredictable generation capacity results
in increased volumes of imbalances.
The case study approach in the literature means that there is still a lack of
understanding, whether and to what extent TSO cross-border cooperation is eco-
nomically efficient for each TSO zone and for the region as a whole. The contribution
of this paper is to present a general model that analyses three degrees of TSO coop-
eration in reserves provision. First, we examine autarkic TSO reserve provision - a
non-cooperative TSO equilibrium. Next we study the supply efficiency of reserves
exchange, where a TSO can acquire reserve capacity in the adjacent TSO area.
The last case investigates reserves sharing. Reserves sharing leads to both supply
efficiency and dimensioning efficiency. We show that each step in the integration of
zones results in progressively lower expected socio-economic costs. We also present
a numerical example in order to illustrate the three scenarios. In addition, to get an
understanding of their order of magnitude, we estimate the possible cost decrease of
cross-border procurement of generation reserves in Central West Europe and Iberia,
based on publicly available procurement data. Lastly, we show that the gains of co-
operation are not equally distributed across TSOs. Some TSOs may even experience
an increase of procurement costs, which makes voluntary cross-border cooperation
harder to achieve. As the European balancing guideline does not specify the details
of inter-TSO agreements, there is, however, room for bargaining.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes various concepts
of electricity balancing, together with types and examples of cross-border balanc-
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ing mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the model and analyses different degrees of
cooperation of cross-border reserves procurement. In section 4, we estimate the
possible cost decrease of cross-border procurement of generation reserves in Central
West Europe and Iberia. Next, section 5 studies the implementation of cross-border
reserves procurement. Section 6 concludes.
2 Electricity balancing
Electricity balancing is the continuous process, in all time horizons, through which
TSOs ensure that a sufficient amount of upward and downward reserves are available
to deal with real-time imbalances between supply and demand in their electricity
transmission system. Imbalances occur due to forecast errors of demand and re-
newable supply and unforeseen events such as line failures and generation outages.
If imbalances between supply and demand persist for a certain period of time, the
electricity system could collapse, leading to a blackout.
Most transmission systems consist of different interconnected networks, which
are each governed by one TSO. Since system frequency is shared on all voltage
levels of a synchronous area, due to the technical characteristics of electricity, power
system reliability is considered to be a common good. That is, a non-excludable
but rival good. This means that a MW of power can only be used once and that
it is technologically difficult to prevent interconnected TSOs from using more than
they provide. Underprovision of reserves in one TSO zone could thus lead to a
widespread blackout throughout the synchronous area. Therefore, to prevent this
‘Tragedy of the Commons’, all TSOs in a synchronous area are obliged to provide
reserves.
Figure 1 shows the two stages of electricity balancing: procurement and acti-
vation. First, to ensure that sufficient reserves are available for real-time balancing,
TSOs procure or contracts an amount of reserves – so-called reserve capacity or
4
balancing capacity – in advance.1 This reserve requirements, R, is stipulated by
network codes and guidelines. To determine the least-cost procurement of reserve
capacity to meet the reserve requirement, the TSO holds an open bidding process
for each type of reserves2 for a given future contracting period. Balancing ser-
vice providers can submit reserve capacity bids, indicating the size [MW] and the
price of the bid [e/MW/hour availability]. In the illustration of Figure 1, bid 1,
bid 2 and part of bid 3 are accepted in the procurement phase to meet a reserve
requirement R. Accepted bids are obliged to be available throughout the contract-
ing period. Second, in each activation period3 of the contracting period the TSO
holds another open bidding process where both the procured reserve capacity and
available non-procured capacity submit balancing energy bids. Bids are accepted
by financial merit order to meet the real-time imbalance or reserve need rt of the
system. Accepted positive bids increase their generation, while accepted negative
bids decrease their generation. In return, they receive the activation price pact. In
the illustration of Figure 1, bid 2, part of bid 3 and an additional non-procured bid
are accepted in the activation phase to meet the real-time imbalance rt.4
In many TSO zones procurement and activation is more complex than the expla-
nation above. For example, some TSOs co-optimise the market clearing of different
types of reserves or assess the reserve capacity bid and the balancing energy bid
1Even network operators with a real-time balancing spot market, like CAISO and Transpower,
still procure some reserve capacity in advance. CAISO procures in the day-ahead market and
hour-ahead market (Zhou et al., 2016), while Transpower holds a yearly tender for long-term
contracts (Transpower, 2013). According to Transpower (2013), the procurement costs are e46.7
million per year.
2In Europe, three main categories of reserves exist: (1) Frequency Containment Reserves
(FCR), which is used for stabilising the frequency after a disturbance; (2) Automatic and Manual
Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR and mFRR), which bring the frequency back to its set-
point value; and (3) Reserve Replacement (RR), which replace the active reserves such that they
are available to react to new disturbances (European Commission, 2017a). These three types are
called primary, secondary and tertiary reserves in North America (Ela et al., 2011).
3The activation period, also called settlement period, can be 15 mins, 30 mins or 1 hour
depending on national market design characteristics. This should be standardized for cooperating
TSO zones. According to Neuhoff and Richstein (2016), convergence to the largely used 15 min
period is supported by most.
4An alternative to merit order activation is pro-rata activation. In that case all procured
reserves are activated but in proportion to their relative procurement bid size.
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Figure 1: Procurement of reserve capacity and activation of balancing energy.
jointly (50Hertz Transmission GmbH et al., 2014).
Both generation and demand could voluntarily participate in balancing mar-
kets, i.e. in both procurement of reserve capacity and activation of balancing energy.
However, if the upward reserve need is so large that available reserves are insuffi-
cient, the TSO will undertake controlled load-shedding as a last resort to avoid a
blackout.
2.1 Cross-border balancing
Under the impulse of increasing renewable energy integration, supranational leg-
islation (European Commission, 2017b,a), and a general drive for more cost effi-
ciency and reliability, some TSOs have started to coordinate electricity balancing
between neighbouring TSO zones. Often cited benefits of cross-border balancing
include a more efficient use of electricity generation, including reduced renewable
energy curtailment (Mott MacDonald, 2013); reduced reserve needs (NREL, 2011);
a higher reliability level (Van den Bergh et al., 2017); internalisation of external
effects on neighbouring TSOs (Tangerås, 2012); a standardization of the rules and
products, which creates a level-playing field; and improved market liquidity, which
increases competition (Hobbs et al., 2005). In the end, all these benefits decrease
the socio-economic cost of balancing. This paper focuses on the first two of the
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above-mentioned benefits:
(A) Supply efficiency: balancing services, both procurement of reserve capacity
to meet reserve requirements and activation of balancing energy to meet real-
time imbalances, are supplied by the cheapest balancing service providers.
That is, if the market is enlarged, expensive balancing services in one part of
the market can be substituted for cheaper ones in a different part of the mar-
ket. The scope for supply efficiency depends on the difference of procurement
and activation costs between cooperating TSO zones.
(B) Dimensioning efficiency: less procurement of reserve capacity is needed
if a TSO in need of capacity can use idle reserve capacity of adjacent TSO
zones.
Cross-border cooperation yields benefits both in procurement of reserve capacity
and activation of balancing energy. Table 1 shows the different degrees of coopera-
tion that are possible in procurement and in activation.
Table 1: Degrees of cooperation in cross-border balancing between TSO zones.
PROCUREMENT ACTIVATION
of reserve capacity of balancing energy
To meet the reserve requirements resulting To meet real-time imbalances resulting from
from reserve dimensioning forecast errors and unforeseen events
Autarky: no cross-border cooperation Autarky: no cross-border cooperation
Exchange: procure reserves in other zones Imbalance netting: avoid counteracting
Sharing: multiple zones take into account activation
the same reserves Exchange: activate reserves in other zones
First, the three degrees of cooperation in procurement of reserve capacity are au-
tarky, exchange and sharing. Reserves exchange makes it possible to procure part
of the required level of reserves in adjacent TSO zones. These reserves are contrac-
tually obliged to be available for activation by the contracting TSO and they can
only contribute to meeting this TSO’s required level of reserves. Reserves exchange
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changes the geographical distribution of reserves. More reserves are procured in
cheap TSO zones and less in expensive TSO zones. Reserves exchange increases
supply efficiency by decreasing the procurement costs.
Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to take into account the same reserves
to meet their reserve requirements resulting from reserve dimensioning.5 A TSO
in need of balancing energy can use this shared capacity, if other TSOs do not.
Reserves sharing leads to both supply efficiency and dimensioning efficiency.
Second, the three degrees of cooperation in activation of balancing energy are
autarky, imbalance netting and exchange. Imbalance netting avoids counteracting
activation of balancing energy in adjacent TSO zones. For example, activating up-
ward reserves in response to a negative imbalance in one TSO zone, and separately
activating downward reserves in response to a positive imbalance in another TSO
zone, is inefficient since counteracting imbalances naturally net out on synchronous
networks. A simple coordination of imbalances could avoid this inefficiency. Imbal-
ance netting is a constrained version of exchange of balancing energy.
Exchange of balancing energy is a further degree of cooperation in activation
of balancing energy. It implies that cooperating TSOs construct a common merit
order of balancing energy bids and select the least-cost activation that meets the
net imbalance of the joint TSO zone.6 Imbalance netting and exchange of balancing
energy increase supply efficiency by decreasing the activation costs.
Although in the remainder of this paper, we only study procurement of re-
serve capacity, it should be noted that activation is a prerequisite for implementing
reserves sharing. It only makes sense to decrease the total amount of procured
capacity if balancing energy is activated based on a common merit order and im-
balances are netted out. Exchange of reserve capacity, however, is possible without
5In practice, reserves exchange and sharing is not limitless. Baldursson et al. (2016) summa-
rize the limits on reserves exchange and sharing, as imposed by the EU guideline on electricity
transmission system operation (European Commission, 2017b).
6Other market arrangements, like BSP-TSO and an additional voluntary pool, are also possible
(Doorman and Van der Veen, 2013).
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cooperation in activation.
2.2 Examples of cross-border balancing
Balancing and reserve cooperation between TSOs is still in its infancy. However, a
few examples of successful cooperation exist in Europe and the United States:
In Europe, ENTSO-E is reviewing a number of pilot projects with the aim to
test the feasibility of a multi-TSO cooperation on the cross border procurement of
reserve capacity and activation of balancing energy. First, the International Grid
Control Cooperation (IGCC) is a project of imbalance netting of frequency restora-
tion reserves (FRR) to avoid counteracting activation of balancing energy (Just,
2015). The IGCC was launched in 2012 and currently consists of TSOs from Aus-
tria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and
Switzerland. Second, a part of this group of countries (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) also jointly procure frequency contain-
ment reserves (FCR) in a weekly auction. Third, the Trans-European Replacement
Reserves Exchange (TERRE) is established between UK, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Switzerland. The project aims to jointly acti-
vate replacement reserves (ENTSO-E, 2016; Neuhoff and Richstein, 2016). A fourth
example of TSO cooperation is the Regulating Power Market (RPM), which was
established in 2002 between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The RPM is
a common merit order of manual frequency restoration reserves (mFRR) activation.
In the United States, a cross-border energy imbalance market (EIM) was es-
tablished between CAISO and PacifiCorp in November 2014. As of 2016 the cross-
border EIM consists of five network operators and public utilities in eight states.
According to CAISO (2017), the benefits amounted to $173.72 million between
2014Q4 and 2017Q2 and are expected to increase even more in the future with an
increased share of renewable generation.
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3 Benefits of cross-border reserves procurement
This section studies the benefits of cross-border procurement of reserve capacity.
We derive analytical expressions for the optimal level of procured reserves and study
the associated cost decreases. Each degree of cross-border cooperation is analysed:
autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. Transmission constraints are an
important issue affecting power grids. In this paper, however, we assume, as a first
approximation, that there is enough transmission capacity available to accommo-
date the flows arising from balancing. Incorporating transmission constraints is an
important issue for further research.
3.1 Model
This model studies two TSO zones i = 1, 2 that can either not cooperate (autarky),
exchange reserves or share reserves. The need for reserves in TSO zone i at a certain
instant is denoted by a random variable ri [MW]. This is the real-time imbalance
between supply and demand due to a combination of forecast errors of demand and
intermittent supply, and failures of generation capacity or transmission components.
We denote the joint probability density function of the reserve needs by f(r1, r2)
and the marginal density functions of r1 and r2 by f1 and f2 respectively.7 The
TSO’s variable of choice is Ri [MW], the quantity of reserves procured for its own
zone i. The contracting period for the procurement of reserve capacity could be e.g.
an hour, a week, a month, or a year. In the model we only focus on procurement
of upward reserves. Negative reserve procurement is the mirror analysis and its
equations are similarly interpreted.
In this paper we are interested in efficiency gains from exchange or sharing of
reserve procurement, not efficient activation as such. Hence, the model does not
take reserves activation into consideration and we therefore take marginal generation
7The joint probability density function f(r1, r2) will in general depend on the procurement
interval and the time to real-time operation.
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costs to be equal to zero. Costs of procuring Ri of reserve capacity in TSO zone
i, however, are not zero and are given by γi(Ri), with γi increasing, smooth and
convex.
Figure 2 summarizes the order of events. First the TSO at each node i chooses
how much reserve capacity Ri to procure. In case of exchange or sharing of reserves,
the procurement may entail payments between TSOs. Next, in real time, the actual
need for reserves ri is observed in each node i. The procured reserves will be used
to accommodate the reserve needs. In case local reserves are insufficient, TSOs will
use exchanged or shared reserves, or, as a last resort, carry out load shedding. Last,
settlement payments - if any - are made.
t
Procurement of
reserve capacity Ri
Actual reserve
need ri observed
Settlement
payments
Figure 2: Order of events
3.2 Optimal autarkic TSO reserve provision
We first consider the case where there is no trade or exchange of reserves between
zones. Thus, each TSO zone operates as an isolated “island”. In reality, network
codes and guidelines stipulate the quantity of reserves each TSO zone is required to
procure.8 However, here we pursue an alternative approach by considering the first-
best outcome within this setting, i.e. where TSO i procures a quantity of reserves
Ri such that expected social surplus in Zone i is maximized.9 We assume the value
of lost load (VoLL - measured in e/MWh) is fixed at v and that electricity demand
Di is price inelastic and also valued at v. Hence, for a given level of reserve needs
ri and procured reserves Ri social surplus is given by consumer surplus net of costs
8Such an exogenous requirement is also standard in reliability management of the day-ahead
market, where the N-1 reliability criterion is used instead of balancing the costs of reliability and
interruptions (Ovaere and Proost, 2016).
9If the reserve requirements of network codes diverge from this first-best optimum (e.g. due to
imperfect information or socio-political constraints), costs are higher than in the first-best.
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of interruptions (due to unserved demand) and costs of procuring reserves,
Si = vDi − v [ri −Ri]+ − γi (Ri) . (1)
The TSO selects Ri to maximize E [Si] with respect to Ri
max
Ri
{
vDi − v
∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri) dri − γi (Ri)
}
(2)
Equivalently, since demand is inelastic, the TSO can minimize combined costs of
interruptions and reserves, i.e.
min
Ri
{
v
∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri) dri + γi (Ri)
}
. (3)
This is the approach we shall use henceforth.
Differentiating (3) we derive the following first-order condition for the optimal
quantity of reserves Rai in autarky:
v Pr {ri > Rai } = γ′i (Rai ) . (4)
The condition (4) is very intuitive: reserves should be procured up to the point
where the marginal cost of procurement (right-hand side) is equal to the marginal
cost of interruptions (left-hand side). The left-hand side might be interpreted as
VoLL times the loss of load probability (LoLP). The second-order condition for
minimum is easily seen to be satisfied.
3.3 Reserves exchange
We now turn to the case of reserves exchange, which as explained earlier, makes it
possible to procure part of the required level of reserves in adjacent TSO zones. We
assume here that sufficient transmission capacity is available to accommodate the
flows arising from use of reserve capacity in adjacent TSO zones and thus neglect
any limits transmission capacity constraints would place on reserves exchange (Van
den Bergh et al., 2017). That is, there is only load-shedding if ri > Ri, irrespective
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of where the reserve capacity is procured. To make the setting non-vacuous we
assume that procurement costs are not symmetrical so there is a motive for reserves
exchange.
This sections shows that exchange of reserves only leads to supply efficiency,
not dimensioning efficiency. We study two variants of reserves exchange. First, that
the required level of reserves in each TSO zone is the same as in autarky (regulated
reserve levels); and second, that it is adjusted in accordance with procurement
prices of reserves exchange (locally optimal reserve levels).
3.3.1 Regulated reserves levels
Here we assume, in accordance with the EU guideline on electricity transmission
system operation (European Commission, 2017b), that the required level of reserves
in each TSO zone is the same as in autarky, i.e. Rai .
In the first-best solution for this setting the two TSOs jointly minimise total
costs of procurement, subject to the constraint on reserves. That is, the cheapest
reserve capacity in the two TSO zones is procured first. This amounts to the
following constrained cost minimization
min
R1,R2
{γ1(R1) + γ2(R2)} s.t. R1 +R2 = Ra1 +Ra2. (5)
Note that Ri denotes the combined quantity of reserves procured in Zone i by the
two TSOs. The side constraint simply says that the overall quantity of reserves
procured has to equal the sum of the required reserve levels in the two zones. This
minimization problem is easily seen to lead to the following set of equations:
γ′1(R1) = γ′2(R2)
R1 +R2 = Ra1 +Ra2.
(6)
That is, overall costs are lowest when the marginal cost of reserve procurement is
equal in the two TSO zones. Fig. 3 shows this cost minimization graphically.
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Figure 3: Cost minimization under reserves exchange between two TSO zones
The axis runs from left to right for TSO zone 1 and from right to left for TSO zone
2. The upward sloping lines are the marginal procurement costs in Zone 1 and 2.
Clearly, if costs are symmetrical in the two zones, then there is no reason to exchange
reserves and the optimal solution is for each TSO to procure reserves within his own
zone. If costs are asymmetrical, then there is a rationale for exchange. The grey
area in the figure represents the reduction of procurement costs under the optimal
procurement of reserves as compared to the costs in autarky where exchange is not
possible and each zone supplies its own required reserves.
3.3.2 Locally optimal reserves levels
In the previous section we considered reserves exchange where required reserve
levels were assumed to be given by regulation.10 Since the regulatory levels in
our model were set so as to match marginal costs of interruptions and reserves, the
resulting outcome after opening up for exchange is, however, no longer an optimum:
marginal interruption costs no longer match marginal costs of procuring reserves;
it will be tempting to lower required reserves in the cheaper zone, where marginal
procurement costs have risen, and raise them in the more expensive zone, where
they have fallen.
10We assumed the regulation to hold TSOs to autarkic levels, even after exchange is allowed,
but in principle the regulation could be set at any arbitrary level.
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So another scenario is possible when TSOs are allowed to adjust their reserves
levels in accordance with prices; this would seem likely to be the tendency over the
longer run.
Again, we begin by considering the first-best solution for the present setting.
This involves finding the jointly optimal reserve levels, viz. solving
min
R1,R2,Re1,R
e
1 s.t. R1+R2=Re1+Re2
{ 2∑
i=1
v
∫ ∞
Rei
[ri −Rei ] fi (ri) dri +
2∑
i=1
γi (Ri)
}
(7)
where Rj is the amount of reserves procured in Zone j (as before) and Rei is the
amount of reserves procured by TSO i.
It is readily seen that the optimal solution in this case is determined by the
condition that all marginal costs be equal, both across zones and cost types. In
other words,
v Pr {r1 > Re1} = v Pr {r2 > Re2} = γ′1 (R1) = γ′2(R2)11
R1 +R2 = Re1 +Re2.
(8)
3.4 Reserves sharing
Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to draw on the same reserves resources
to meet their required level of reserves when it comes to operation. Recall that
while exchange of reserves only leads to supply efficiency, reserves sharing leads
to both supply efficiency and dimensioning efficiency. As before, we assume that
transmission capacity is sufficient to always accommodate the flows arising from
use of reserve capacity in adjacent TSO zones. That is, there is only load-shedding
11For simplification we have assumed the VoLL (v) to be identical across zones. In some adju-
cent markets, e.g. in the EU, estimations of VoLL differ. Different VoLL can easily be taken into
account, but would slightly complicate the analysis without significantly changing results. Specif-
ically, the condition that marginal costs of interruption is the same across zones would continue
to hold, but the expression for it would change: (Here an expression where v is replaced by v1 in
the first MC and by v2 in the second MC.) In particular, the LoLP would be higher in the zone
with the lower VoLL and vice versa
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if r1 + r2 > R1 +R2.
In our model, reserves sharing amounts to maximizing the surplus of the two
zones jointly, in effect uniting them.12 As before, since we take demand to be
inelastic, this is tantamount to minimizing expected costs of interruptions and pro-
curement:
min
Rs1,R
s
2
{
v
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Rs1+Rs2
[r1 + r2 −Rs1 −Rs2] f (r1, r2) dr1dr2 − γ1 (Rs1)− γ2 (Rs2)
}
(9)
The optimal reserve capacities when reserves sharing is allowed, Rs1 and Rs2, are
determined from the following first-order conditions:
v Pr {r1 + r2 > Rs1 +Rs2} = γ′1 (Rs1)
v Pr {r1 + r2 > Rs1 +Rs2} = γ′2 (Rs1) 13
(10)
which are derived by differentiation of (9) with respect to Rs1 and Rs2, respectively.
The first-order equations imply that marginal costs of reserves procurement are
equal to VoLL times the loss of load probability in the two zones together. Clearly,
this implies that marginal costs of procurement are equal at the optimal levels
of procurement, γ′1(Rs1) = γ′2(Rs2). Hence, the costs of reserves procurement are
minimized as in reserves exchange, but for different levels of reserves and, hence,
also reliability.
3.5 Efficiency of different degrees of cooperation
To compare the efficiency of the different degrees of cooperation, we need to compute
the total costs cj for each degree of cooperation j ∈ {a, e, l, s}. It leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Each step in the integration of zones results in progressively lower
expected socio-economic costs, i.e. ca ≥ ce ≥ cl ≥ cs.
12As a simplification, we neglect any limits on reserves sharing, see Baldursson et al. (2016).
13As in the case of exchange, different VoLL can easily be taken into account, see footnote 11
above
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Proof. Recall that for each degree of cooperation j ∈ {a, e, l, s}, Rji is the optimal
amount of reserves procured in Zone i and cj is the sum of procurement costs and
interruption costs in both TSO zones. By contrast, Ri is the amount of reserves
procured by TSO i. Equation (11) is the sum of procurement costs and interruption
costs with autarky. This minimization determines Ra1 and Ra2. Adding an additional
variable Re1 leads to equal interruption costs and weakly lower procurement costs
in equation (12). The inequality is strict if Re1 6= Ra1 and Re2 6= Ra2. Adding even
more variables to allow a trade off between procurement costs and interruption costs
causes equation (13) to be weakly lower than equation (12). Again the inequality
is strict if Re1 6= Ra1 and Re2 6= Ra2. To proof the last inequality, notice that equation
(13) equals equation (14) if the correlation of reserve needs is one. If the correlation
is lower than one, both procurement costs and interruption costs decrease.
ca = min
Ra1 ,R
a
2
{
vE [r1 −Ra1]+ + vE [r2 −Ra2]+ + γ1(Ra1) + γ2(Ra2)
}
(11)
≥ ce = min
Re1
{
vE [r1 −Ra1]+ + vE [r2 −Ra2]+ + γ1(Re1) + γ2(Ra1 +Ra2 −Re1)
}
(12)
≥ cl = min
Rl1,R1,R2
{
vE [r1 −R1]+ + vE [r2 −R2]+ + γ1(Rl1) + γ2(R1 +R2 −Rl1)
}
(13)
with R1 +R2 = Rl1 +Rl2
≥ cs = min
Rs1,R
s
2
{
vE [r1 + r2 −Rs1 −Rs2]+ + γ1(Rs1) + γ2(Rs2)
}
(14)
This can also be shown graphically. Figure 4 shows the socio-economic costs
for each degree of cross-border cooperation. The increasing lines are the marginal
procurement costs to reach a certain reliability level ρ.14 As a result, the area below
such a line is the total procurement cost to reach reliability level ρ (dark grey area)
and interruption costs are v(1− ρ) (light grey area). In aggregate, a higher degree
14Reliability ρ ∈ [0, 1] can be defined in multiple ways. For example, ρ = 1− LOLP, where the
loss of load probability (LOLP) is the probability of being in a state of the world where some load
shedding is needed; or ρ = fraction of total demanded load [MWh] that is supplied to consumers.
17
of cooperation leads to lower procurement costs to reach a certain reliability level,
i.e. γa(ρ¯) > γe(ρ¯) > γs(ρ¯). Figures 4a and 4b show that moving from autarky to
exchange with regulated reserve levels leads to lower procurement costs but leaves
interruption costs unchanged, because the reliability level is held fixed. Proceeding
to exchange with locally optimal reserve levels (Figure 4c) increases procurement
costs but less than the decreases of interruption costs. This analysis also shows
that moving from autarky to locally optimal exchange has an ambiguous effect on
procurement costs because the cost increase of a higher reliability level can exceed
the cost decrease of reserves exchange. The cost decrease depends on the cost
asymmetry between procurement costs in both TSO zones. Last, reserves sharing
(Figure 4d) leads to an even higher reliability level and thus interruption costs
decrease. As before, its effect on procurement costs is ambiguous and depends on
the correlation of reserve needs in TSO zones. The next section presents a numerical
illustration of the benefits of cross-border cooperation and studies the comparative
statics of the main parameters.
3.6 Numerical illustration and comparative statics
The benefits of cross-border exchange and sharing of reserve capacity depend on
two parameters: the difference in procurement cost in both TSO zones (g1 and g2)
and the correlation of reserve needs between TSO zones (ξ = corr(r1, r2)). Supply
efficiency increases if procurement costs are more asymmetric and dimensioning
efficiency increases if reserve needs are less correlated. Figure 5 plots the sum
of interruption costs and procurement costs with reserves exchange and sharing,
relative to the costs in autarky, and shows that the benefits of exchange increase with
cost asymmetry (g1/g2) and that the benefits of sharing increase with decreasing
reserve need correlation ξ.The probability density functions of reserve needs are
jointly normal with correlation ξ, each with a mean of 0 MW and a variance of 100
MW: N(0,100). The cost of reserve procurement in Zone i is γi(Ri) = giR2i , with
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Figure 4: Degrees of cooperation: cost efficiency and reliability level.
g1 = g2 = 1 at g1/g2 = 1. The VoLL is 10,000 e/MWh.
Figure 5 illustrates several issues. First, when the two TSO zones have identical
procurement costs, no cost arbitrage is possible and exchange of reserve does not
yield any cost reduction. However, reserves sharing leads to a lower reserve need and
thus a lower cost. Second, when the cost of reserve procurement differs between TSO
zones, reserves exchange does yield a cost reduction. For example, when the cost
of reserve procurement is higher in TSO zone 1, TSO 1 procures part of its reserve
obligation with reserve capacity providers in TSO zone 2. Third, the cost reduction
decreases when the reserve needs in the two TSO zones are more correlated. When
the reserve needs are fully correlated, reserves sharing yields almost no additional
cost reduction compared to reserves exchange.
Figure 5 also illustrates that the cost reduction increases when reserve procure-
ment costs become more asymmetric and reserve needs are less correlated. With low
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Figure 5: Relative cost of reserves exchange and reserves sharing, as a function of the
cost asymmetry (g1/g2) and the reserve needs correlation (ξ).
cost asymmetry and low correlation, reserves sharing yields the major part of the
cost reduction, while with high cost asymmetry and a high correlation, reserves ex-
change yields the major part of the cost reduction. With symmetric costs and high
correlation, cross-border cooperation in reserves yields very little cost reduction.
Table 2 analyses in detail the reserves, total procurement costs and total in-
terruption costs for the values used in Figure 5, with g1 = 2 and g2 = 1. The table
shows that sharing reduces the total amount of procured reserves and decreases in-
terruption costs (increases the reliability level). Note that sharing with correlation
ξ = 1 is equal to exchange with locally optimal reserves.
Table 2: Reserves and costs in Zone 1 and 2: g1 = 2, g2 = 1 (PC = procurement cost,
IC = interruption cost).
R1 R2 R1+R2
Relative
reserves PC IC
Total
costs
Relative
costs
Autarky 23.5 25.7 49.2 100% 1763 479 2242 100%
Exchange 16.4 32.8 49.2 100% 1611 479 2090 93.2%
Sharing ξ = 1 16.5 33.0 49.6 100.8% 1638 429 2067 92.2%
Sharing ξ = 0.5 14.6 29.1 43.7 88.9% 1273 324 1597 71.2%
Sharing ξ = 0 12.2 24.4 36.6 74.4% 891 217 1108 49.4%
In addition to cost asymmetry and the reserve needs correlation, three other param-
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eters influence relative costs of reserves exchange and sharing: VoLL (v), procure-
ment costs, and the relative size of the TSO zones. Table 3 compares the relative
cost of the base case with a case with higher VoLL, a case with higher procurement
costs, and a case where countries differ in size. First, the relative gains of coopera-
tion increase with increasing VoLL, since both the gains of decreased interruption
costs and decreased procurement costs are higher. Second, higher procurement
costs decrease the relative gains of cooperation. Third, if the TSO zones differ in
size15 the relative gains of cooperation decrease.
Table 3: Sensitivity of relative costs [%].
BASE v = 10vb gi = 10gi,b σ2 = 6σb
Autarky 100 100 100 100
Exchange 93.2 92 95.5 96.7
Sharing ξ = 1 92.2 91.2 94.0 96.1
Sharing ξ = 0.5 71.2 69.9 73.9 85.4
Sharing ξ = 0 49.4 48.0 52.4 74.6
4 Estimation of the procurement cost decrease of
cross-border procurement
While the previous section presented a small numerical illustration to show
the effect of reserve needs correlation and of asymmetry of procurement costs, this
section estimates the possible cost decrease of cross-border procurement of auto-
matic frequency restoration reserves (aFRR)16 between Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. As discussed in section 2.2, Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands have already implemented imbalance netting and
15The relationship between the size of a TSO zone and its reserve need standard deviation σ is
not linear because larger countries already internalize their imbalance variability. If the correlation
of reserve needs between regions of a TSO zone 1 is ξ1 and this zone is 2n times larger than an
adjacent TSO zone 2, then σ1 = (
√
2(1 + ξ))nσ2. If ξ1 = 0.65, σ1 = 6σ2.
16aFRR is used to bring the frequency back to its setpoint value in case of imbalances.
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jointly procure frequency containment reserves (FCR) in a weekly auction. How-
ever, they do not yet jointly procure aFRR. This section shows that the gains of
exchanging and sharing aFRR are substantial. Our estimation differs from earlier
studies (see 1), because it is not based on simulation but based on actual market
data. To our knowledge, the only exception is (Vandezande et al., 2009) who esti-
mate the cost decrease of a Belgium-Netherlands cross-border balancing market in
2008. Our study, however, estimates the cost decrease of cross-border exchange and
sharing of aFRR for 2015-2016 in different subsets of Central West Europe (CWE)
and Iberia.17
4.1 Data
We use price and quantity data of aFRR procurement in Belgium, France,
Germany18, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The data are publicly available
on the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform19 since the end of 2014. For each con-
sidered country i and for each time instant t, these consist of a price pit [e/MWh]
and procured capacity Rit [MW]. The granularity of time instants goes from hourly
(Portugal and Spain) to yearly (France). In Belgium, France and the Netherlands,
only the average price of reserve procurement is reported, while Germany, Portu-
gal and Spain report the marginal price of the procurement auction. The price
and quantity data are complemented with imbalance data rit [MWh], which has
a granularity between 15 minutes and 1 hour. Table 4 summarizes the imbalance
and procurement data in the considered European countries. The complete dataset
consists of 105,264 values of r, p and R. That is, 731 days of 24 hours for 6 countries.
We only present detailed results for procurement of positive reserves. However,
as prices, procured capacities and imbalances are similar for negative reserves, their
17German TSOs already exchange aFRR capacity since December 1th 2007.
18German data also contain Luxembourg.
19To supplement and check the data, we have also used websites of the TSOs in the six countries.
For example, German data of marginal prices comes from www.regelleistung.net, the platform for
cooperation between the four German TSOs.
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Table 4: Summary of available imbalance and procurement data in considered European
countries (Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform).
rt Rt Since Price
Belgium 15’ weekly 01.08.2016 average
monthly 01.01.2015 average
France 30’ yearly 01.01.2015 average
Germany 15’ weekly 27.06.2011 marginal
Netherlands 15’ monthly 01.01.2016 average
yearly 01.01.2015 average
Portugal 60’ hourly 13.12.2014 marginal
Spain 60’ hourly 12.12.2014 marginal
procurement cost decrease is comparable.
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the procurement and imbalance data.
For both 2015 and 2016, this table reports the minimum, maximum and average
procurement price and procured quantity. For example, the first row shows that
in Belgium the marginal price of procurement20 is between 17.3 e/MWh and 34
e/MWh, with an average of 23.4 e/MWh. The procured aFRR capacity is between
140 MW and 148 MW, with an average of 141 MW. Germany procures by far the
largest amount of aFRR capacity, while Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal pro-
cure the smallest amount of aFFR capacity. Average prices are lowest in Germany
and highest in the Netherlands (2015) and Belgium (2016). The last column reports
the positive imbalance value r+ [MW] that is not exceeded in 99% of hours with
positive imbalance.21 In European countries, the total reserve capacity of aFRR,
mFRR and RR should be sufficient to cover this 99% limit (European Commission,
2017b, art. 157.(2)(h)). Comparison of the two last columns shows that Germany
satisfies this requirement with aFRR only, while the other five countries do not.
Section 4.2 explains how we deal with this in our estimation.
In addition to the summary statistics of Table 5, Figure 6 shows the marginal
20See section 4.2 that deals with the calculation methodology.
21For reference, the hourly 2016 peak demand and average demand [GW] in the six countries
are: France (81.2/53.4), Germany (57/48), Spain (40.1/28.5), Netherlands (19.7/13), Belgium
(13.6/9.9) and Portugal (8.1/5.6) (Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform).
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Table 5: Summary of aFRR procurement data in considered European countries (Source:
ENTSO-E Transparency Platform).
[e/MW/h] and [MW] Year pmin pmax pav Rmin Rmax Rav r+99%
Belgium 2015 17.3 34 23.4 140 148 141 4322016 15.4 87.7 26.8 140 150 142 456
France 2015 18.3 18.3 18.3 500 1177 647 23522016 18.4 18.4 18.4 500 1100 639 2718
Germany 2015 2.58 24 7.2 2026 2500 2070 17392016 1.88 24 5.6 1973 2500 2014 1541
Netherlands 2015 27.4 27.4 27.4 300 300 300 9922016 14.1 21.3 17.8 170 170 170 896
Portugal 2015 5 61.4 20.5 66 322 171 6972016 4 80.1 16.6 56 333 173 860
Spain 2015 2.1 121 19.6 467 913 685 38462016 0.76 200 15.6 399 927 682 2447
prices of aFRR in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain for all
hours of 01.01.2015 to 31.12.2016. Portuguese prices are not shown because they
are close to the prices in Spain.22 As the hourly data of Germany and Spain is
volatile, we report their 24-hour moving average. The price of the yearly auction in
France is almost the same throughout the assessed period, while the prices in the
Netherlands are constant and above French prices in 2015 but decrease in 2016, after
moving to monthly auctions. Belgium, which went from monthly to weekly auctions
after August 2016, saw a price spike at the end of 2016. This figure also shows that,
except for Germany, price lines cross constantly. As a result, no single country is
the most expensive at all times. In Germany, prices are almost consistently lower
than in the other five countries.
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between imbalances in the six con-
sidered countries. These values are statistically different from zero at the 0.0001%
level, except for the correlation between Netherlands and France, Portugal and
Spain. As none of these country-pairs has a high positive correlation, significant
efficiency gains of reserves sharing are possible.
22Prices in Portugal and Spain have correlation coefficient of 0.7 for 2015-2016.
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Figure 6: Marginal price of aFRR in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and
Spain (01.01.2015-31.12.2016)
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Table 6: Correlation coefficients between imbalances in the six considered countries
(aFRR).
Belgium France Germany Netherlands Portugal Spain
Belgium 1
France 0.068 1
Germany -0.122 -0.035 1
Netherlands -0.160 -0.005 0.094 1
Portugal -0.026 -0.08 0.029 0.006 1
Spain -0.038 -0.051 0.060 0.005 -0.019 1
25
4.2 Methodology
First, we need to make an assumption on the functional form of the supply
curves of generation reserves. Our only available information is the price-quantity
pair for each of the 17544 hours for each country. Figure 7 plots these points for
Germany, Spain, Belgium and Portugal. These plots clearly show that the supply
curve is not constant throughout the period. Therefore, as there is only one price-
quantity pair for each hour, we assume that for each considered country i and for
each hour t the supply curve is linear between the origin and (Rit, pit):
bit =
pit
Rit
(15)
Figure 7: Scatterplot of procurement price and quantity for Germany, Spain, Belgium
and Portugal (01.01.2015-31.12.2016).
1800 2000 2200 2400 2600
0
5
10
15
20
25
Quantity [MW]
Pr
ic
e 
[eu
ro/
MW
/h]
Germany
200 400 600 800 1000
0
50
100
150
200
Quantity [MW]
Pr
ic
e 
[eu
ro/
MW
/h]
Spain
140 142 144 146 148 150
0
20
40
60
80
100
Quantity [MW]
Pr
ic
e 
[eu
ro/
MW
/h]
Belgium
0 100 200 300 400
0
20
40
60
80
100
Quantity [MW]
Pr
ic
e 
[eu
ro/
MW
/h]
Portugal
Second, in our dataset some countries report the average price while others the
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marginal price. As we assume supply to be linear, marginal prices are assumed to
be twice the average price.
Third, as before, we do not focus on transmission capacity and assume that it
never constraints cross-border cooperation. However, we illustrate the importance
of an institutional constraint on reserves exchange and sharing. The European
Commission (2017b) imposes that minimally 50% of required aFRR should be in
the own country (exchange) and that required aFRR capacity can not decrease
more than 30%, compared to the autarkic level (sharing) (Baldursson et al., 2016).
Results are shown both with and without these constraints.
4.2.1 Reserves exchange
The procurement cost decrease of reserve capacity exchange can be calculated
using equation (6) in the case of two countries. Figure 8 shows their supply curves
and the cost decrease is represented by the gray area. Generalizing this to exchange
of generation reserve capacity between n countries, the common marginal price of
procurement pnew for each hour t is:
pnew =
n∏
i=1
bi
n∑
i=1
n∏
j 6=i
bj
n∑
i=1
Ri with bi =
pi
Ri
(16)
Figure 8: The procurement cost decrease of reserves exchange between two countries
R1,t R2,t
e/MWh
R1R2
p1,t
p2,t
pnew
As the supply slopes are assumed to be linear, the decrease of procurement
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costs ∆PC due to cross-border exchange of generation reserve capacity for each
hour t is:
∆PC = 0.5
( n∑
i=1
Ripi − pnew
n∑
i=1
Ri
)
(17)
where pi and qi are the actual price and procured quantity in country i, and pnew is
the price determined by the common merit order and the total procured quantity
of the n countries that are exchanging reserves.
4.2.2 Reserves sharing
The gains from sharing of generation reserve capacity between n countries are
calculated using the following expression:
v Pr
{
n∑
i=1
ri >
n∑
i=1
Rsi
}
= pnew (18)
where pnew is calculated from (16) and the value of lost load (VoLL) v is assumed to
be 10, 000 e/MWh. . This expression is the n-country generalization of equation
(10). It shows that the total reserve capacity of n reserve-sharing countries is
optimal when the marginal expected interruption cost (left-hand side) equals the
marginal cost of reserves (right-hand side). The country in which these reserves are
procured depends on the countries’ individual supply curves.
The cumulative distribution function of aggregate imbalances in n countries is
estimated based on the imbalance data rit of 2015-2016. We see in the data that the
probability distribution function of imbalances is a symmetrical bell-shaped curve
with mean slightly above zero and fatter tails than the normal distribution.23
Again, we estimate the equation for each hour separately, which means that
the total procured reserve capacity differs every hour, depending on pnew.24 The
23In reality, obviously, it is estimated based on historical data, but since only little imbalance
data prior to 2015 is available on the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform, we use 2015-2016 data.
This should not greatly influence our estimation results.
24To simplify the procurement auction in reality, TSOs might choose
n∑
i=1
Rsi for a longer period,
which decreases the possible gain.
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higher this price, the lower the procured reserve capacity.
The decrease of procurement costs E from cross-border sharing of generation
reserve capacity is also calculated from equation (17). However, as we can not make
statements about the optimality of actual aFRR capacity that is currently procured
in each of the six countries25, we will calculate the cost decrease relative to optimal
autarkic reserves procurement, i.e. according to equation (4).
As noted before, European Commission (2017b, art. 157.(2)(h)) requires that
the sum of procured aFRR, mFRR and RR should be sufficient to cover 99% of
all imbalances. As we only study aFRR, but still need to link procured capacity
to system imbalances to calculate the gains of aFRR sharing, the imbalance data
are scaled by the ratio of average procured reserve capacity (Rav) and the required
reserve capacity to cover 99% of all imbalances (r+99%). This means that for all
countries, except for Germany, the imbalance data are scaled down.
4.3 Results
To make comparison easy, the calculations are done separately for 2015 and
2016.
4.3.1 Cost decrease due to reserves exchange
Table 7 presents the decrease of procurement costs [million e per year] due to
reserves exchange between different sets of countries. The second and third column
present results for 2015, while the last two columns present results for 2016. This
estimation is only for procurement of positive aFRR, not for activation. Also note
that we only focus on the cost decrease of procurement. The change of interruption
costs (see section 3.6) is not assessed. For 2015, we estimate a procurement cost
25As the optimal trade off minimizes the sum of procurement and interruption costs, procure-
ment costs can both increase or decrease when moving from the currently procured aFRR capacity
to the optimal quantity with sharing.
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decrease of two-country reserves exchange of less than e1 million (Belgium-France
and Belgium-Netherlands) up to e19 million (France-Germany). Gains are higher
for 2016, except for Germany-Netherlands, as Dutch prices decreased in 2016. Ev-
idently, the gains increase when more countries are cooperating. As their costs are
similar, the gains due to exchange between Belgium, France and Netherlands are
limited. However, when these countries exchange reserves with Germany, where
costs are low, significant gains are possible. The total yearly gains of reserves ex-
change between the six countries exceed e60 million per year. The expected gains
of exchanging positive and negative aFRR are thus around e160 million per year.
Lastly, the third and fifth column show that the estimated gains decrease with only
a few million e per year by imposing the restriction that minimally 50% of the
reserve requirement should be met locally.
Table 7: Cost decrease [Me/year] due to exchange of aFRR for different sets of countries.
[Me/year] 2015 2016
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Belgium-France 0.88 0.88 2.89 2.77
Belgium-Netherlands 0.70 0.70 2.73 2.69
Belgium-Germany 7.13 6.36 10.59 9.02
France-Germany 18.94 17.88 24.37 22.32
France-Spain 6.68 6.67 9.74 9.58
Germany-Netherlands 19.44 17.28 6.46 5.78
Portugal-Spain 1.62 1.60 1.88 1.85
France-Portugal-Spain 7.63 7.60 11.19 11.03
Belgium-France-Netherlands 3.57 3.57 3.24 3.11
Belgium-Germany-Netherlands 26.05 23.39 16.80 14.68
Belgium-France-Germany-Netherlands 42.40 39.65 39.42 36.04
Belgium-France-Germany-...
Netherlands-Portugal-Spain 67.79 64.34 63.06 58.01
This is a computation for the procurement of positive aFRR. Exchange of
negative aFRR capacity leads to an additional e100 million per year. This is larger
than the gain for positive aFRR because the price of German negative reserves is
somewhat lower than of positive reserves. Only focusing on Central West Europe
(CWE), exchange of negative reserves leads to around e75 million per year. The
total gain of aFRR exchange is therefore around e117 million per year in the CWE
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area and around e160 million per year if all six countries cooperate.
4.3.2 Cost decrease due to reserves sharing
Table 8 presents the decrease of procurement costs [million e per year] of
reserves sharing between different sets of countries. As proven in section 3, these
are larger than the gains of exchange if the imbalance correlation is smaller than
one. Table 8 shows that the gains of sharing are a multiple of the gains of exchange.
The reason is that the imbalance correlations are close to zero. For example, the
procurement cost decrease for Belgium-France, Belgium-Netherlands and Portugal-
Spain are low for exchange but considerably for sharing, because their marginal
costs are similar but their imbalances have a low correlation. The yearly gains of
two-country reserves sharing are e22 million (Belgium-Germany) up to e75 million
(France-Germany), while the total yearly gains of reserves exchange between the six
countries exceeds e200 million per year. The third and fifth column show that the
constraints on reserves sharing have little effect on the estimated gains. Lastly, as
noted before, the gains are estimated relative to procurement costs in case of optimal
reserves procurement in autarky, i.e. according to equation (4). As the procured
reserve capacity is not necessarily optimal in our data, the change of procurement
costs from sharing will be different when compared to current procurement costs.
Sharing of negative reserves is estimated to lead to an additional e350 million
in 2015 and e300 million in 2016, such that the total gain of aFRR sharing is
between e500 and e600 million per year. Only focusing on the CWE area, sharing
of negative reserves leads to an additional e225 million in 2015 and e198 million in
2016, such that the total gain of aFRR sharing is between e370 and e310 million
per year.
The estimated gains of sharing depend on VoLL. A higher VoLL leads to a
higher optimal reliability level and thus higher procurement costs. As a result,
possible gains of sharing also increase. Table 9 shows that the procurement cost
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Table 8: Cost decrease [Me/year] due to sharing of aFRR for different sets of countries.
[Me/year] 2015 2016
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Belgium-France 23.85 23.82 25.55 25.50
Belgium-Netherlands 28.51 28.51 24.18 24.18
Belgium-Germany 21.90 21.90 21.95 21.95
France-Germany 74.72 74.72 71.16 71.16
France-Spain 67.02 66.96 72.82 72.19
Germany-Netherlands 47.47 47.47 21.55 21.55
Portugal-Spain 49.36 48.36 42.41 41.68
France-Portugal-Spain 108.56 103.15 101.44 95.88
Belgium-France-Netherlands 73.29 72.97 54.99 54.68
Belgium-Germany-Netherlands 69.37 69.37 43.25 43.25
Belgium-France-Germany-Netherlands 142.83 142.83 114.48 114.48
Belgium-France-Germany-...
Netherlands-Portugal-Spain 249.27 248.68 205.74 205.35
decrease changes with around e50 million per year if VoLL is two times smaller or
bigger.
Table 9: Sensitivity of procurement cost decrease [Me/year] to value of lost load v.
year v = 5,000 v = 10,000 v = 20,000
2015 200.60 249.27 307.6
2016 165.85 205.74 251.27
4.3.3 Discussion
As shown earlier in the numerical illustration of section 3.6, most of the pro-
curement cost decrease is due to sharing, if marginal costs are similar and imbal-
ances are not much correlated. However, when marginal costs differ substantially,
as between Germany and its neighbors, exchange already leads to sizeable gains.
A limitation of our estimation is that we assume an unlimited linear supply
curve between the price-quantity pair and the origin. However, the Spanish TSO
makes the hourly supply curves of aFRR publicly available26. These show that a
linear curve through the origin is a good approximation of the actual supply curve
26https://www.esios.ree.es
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up to a certain level. As an indication, the supply curve at 3am and 7pm every
10th day of all 24 months of 2015-2016 is approximately linear through the origin
up to 183% of procured capacity. As a robustness check we have imposed this limit
in our numerical analysis, but the results do not change much.
Another limitation of our estimation is that we assume that cross-border flows
due to reserves cooperation are never constrained. However, this is in line with
European regulation, which requires TSOs to specifically allocate cross-zonal trans-
mission capacity to exchange or sharing of reserve capacity up to the point where it
is economically efficient (European Commission, 2017a, Title IV). This means that,
if procurement of reserve capacity and dispatch of energy are done simultaneously,
the price difference between countries should be equal in both markets, in case of
transmission congestion:
∆γ = γ1 − γ2 = ∆pdispatch (19)
This somewhat decreases our estimated gains, but does not affect reliability, as
cross-zonal transmission capacity is specifically allocated for cross-border reserves
cooperation. As a result, the coordination issues identified by Van den Bergh et al.
(2017) will not occur.
Van den Bergh et al. (2017) estimate the gains of reserves exchange and sharing
in the CWE area to be respectively e40 and e50 million per year, while this paper
estimates these to be respectively e117 and above e310 million per year for aFRR.
The difference in magnitude could be due to their use of data on installed generation
capacity to estimate the reserve and energy supply curve, while our study uses actual
data on market prices and quantities. In addition, they only focuses on imbalances
stemming from wind and solar forecast errors, while our study uses actual data on
system imbalances. This could explain why our study finds much larger gains for
sharing than their study.
A possible avenue for future research is to combine engineering simulation stud-
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ies with economic analysis and market data. Price and quantity data can improve
the estimation of reserve and energy supply curves based on installed generation
capacity.
5 Implementation of cross-border reserves pro-
curement
Whenever TSOs start exchanging and sharing reserves, there are gains and dis-
tributional effects. This section first analyses how the benefits of cooperation are
distributed. Next, we study what institutions improve the incentive for cooperation.
We consider first the autarkic TSO case. In this case, each TSO can implement
a market mechanism to minimize the procurement costs of the reserves required.
Next we discuss the distributional effects of reserves exchange via a uniform-price
auction. These effects can be negative for one of the parties so that compensation
mechanisms need to be put in place to guarantee cooperation. We develop a Nash
bargaining game to study the compensation necessary for TSOs to agree on ex-
change of reserves. This game can be defined for regulated reliability levels as well
as for optimized reliability levels.
5.1 Optimal autarkic TSO reserve provision
The analysis of the previous section is based on the premise that the TSO (in
lieu of a social planner) has direct control of the available reserves. In a market-
based system this is not the case and the reserves have to be procured by some
market mechanism. Here we assume a uniform-price auction with the resulting
price pi.27 The TSO now determines the level of reserves Ri that minimizes the
27Some TSO zones use pay-as-bid clearing but this is considered to be less preferable (Neuhoff
and Richstein, 2016).
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cost of procurement and the cost of interruptions:
min
Ri
{
v
∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri) dri + paiRi
}
, (20)
This results in the first-order condition for the optimal level of reserves.
v Pr {ri > Ri} = pai . (21)
Generation firms supply the reserves. We assume they do not exercise market power
and take prices as given, so generators will bid up to the point where marginal
procurement costs equal the reserves price, i.e. where
γ′i (Ri) = pai . (22)
The market equilibrium is determined by (21) and (22). Clearly, equation (4) follows
from these two conditions so the market equilibrium coincides with the first-best
level of reserves in autarky. In a market implementation the resulting reserves price
is pai .
5.2 Reserves exchange
5.2.1 Regulated reserves levels without inter-TSO compensation
Now suppose we are in a more realistic setting where, instead of a joint minimization
of costs, each TSO minimizes its own costs, subject to the constraint that regulatory
reserve levels must be met. As in the autarkic setting, we assume reserves in
each TSO zone are procured by a uniform-price auction and, moreover, that these
auctions are run simultaneously. Since exchange is unfettered, prices and marginal
procurement costs will be equal in the two zones, i.e.
pe = γ′1(R1) = γ′2(R2), (23)
where pe denotes the price of reserves in exchange, common to the two zones.
Comparing (23) to (6), since each TSO will procure the level of reserves required
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by regulation, it is clear that the market solution achieves the cost-minimizing
outcome.
5.2.2 Inter-TSO transfers to guarantee cooperation
In a transition from autarky to exchange, the reserves price will rise in the cheap
zone where marginal procurement costs are lower in autarky than in exchange, and
fall in the expensive zone where these costs are higher. Hence, the TSO in the cheap
zone will not have an incentive to participate in joint procurement auctions without
compensation. Figure 9 shows this situation, with Zone 1 being the cheaper and
Zone 2 the more expensive. The financial gain of TSO 2 corresponds to area C+D,
whereas the loss of TSO 1 corresponds to area A. TSO 1 can compensate TSO 2
for his loss and retain some surplus provided C +D > A.
A
D
B
C
γ′2(R2)
γ′1(R1)
Ra1 R
a
2
e/MWh
R1R2
pe
pa1
pa2
Figure 9: Cost minimization under reserves exchange between two TSO zones. Area A
indicates the procurement cost increase of TSO 1; area C+D indicates the procurement
cost decrease of TSO 2.
If the cross-border reserves procurement is organized via a uniform-price auction, we
need transfers between the TSOs to guarantee cooperation. We will analyse the sit-
uation where there are lump-sum transfers.28 In principle, there are infinitely many
solutions to the bargaining game between the two TSOs, as long as a bargaining
solution is feasible. Here we use the approach of the Nash bargaining game (Nash,
28Another possibility is a distortionary tax on import or export. However, such a tax would
reduce the gains from trade.
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1953; Binmore et al., 1986) and assume that the autarkic solution is the fallback
for both TSOs. Assuming consumers are compensated for interruptions, total costs
for TSO i in autarky are Cai = paiRai + Li, where Li = v
∫∞
Ri
[ri −Rai ] fi (ri) dri are
expected interruption costs.29 We denote the lump-sum side payment from TSO 2
to TSO 1 by x. Similar to (Kolstad, 2005), the side payment can be interpreted as
a measure of difficulty to make an agreement.
With exchange the TSOs have the following costs:
Ce1 = peRa1 + L1 + x
Ce2 = peRa2 + L2 − x
Assuming equal bargaining power of the two TSOs the Nash product is given by
N = [(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + x] [(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − x] (24)
and the first-order condition for maximum with respect to x turns out to be
x∗ = 12 [((p
a
2 − pe)Ra2 − (pa1 − pe)Ra1)] . (25)
That is, the transfer is 0.5(A + C + D). The drop in costs for TSO i, going
from autarky to exchange with bargaining and side payment is seen to be
Cai − Cei =
1
2 [((p
a
2 − pe)Ra2 − (pe − pa1)Ra1)] (26)
The right-hand side of (26) is half the net financial surplus resulting from reserves
exchange (C + D - A). If one TSO has a stronger bargaining position than the other
this result would not be reached. In this case the stronger TSO would gain more
of the surplus. The basic result that a positive financial surplus is necessary for a
bargaining solution to be feasible would, however, clearly still hold.
The analysis above assumes that a TSO only cares about its procurement
29Since required reserve levels are the same as in autarky it is in fact irrelevant whether con-
sumers receive compensation. This is no longer the case when reserve levels are allowed to adjust
to changed marginal reserve procurement costs.
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costs. In reality, however, a TSO is also concerned about social welfare in its zone,
in part because increased costs of reserves procurement are charged to consumers
through network tariffs, and therefore do not affect TSO profits. Including this
welfare concern into the TSO utility function increases the willingness to cooperate.
Suppose that a TSO has a preference α ∈ [0, 1] for social welfare (SW) and (1− α)
for a decrease of procurement costs (PC). It favours cooperation if:
∆Ui = α∆SWi − (1− α)∆PCi ≥ 0 (27)
With a lump sum transfer y the TSOs have the following changes of utility:
∆U1 = α∆SW1 + (1− α)(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + y (28)
∆U2 = α∆SW2 + (1− α)(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − y (29)
where ∆SW1 equals area B and ∆SW2 equals area C in Figure 9. Assuming equal
bargaining power of the two TSOs the Nash product is given by
N = [α∆SW1 + (1− α)(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + y] [α∆SW2 + (1− α)(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − y] (30)
and the first-order condition for maximum with respect to y turns out to be
y∗ = (1− α)x∗ + α∆SW2 −∆SW12 (31)
That is, if a TSO also cares about social welfare in its zone, the lump sum transfer
is lower, which is an indication that voluntary cooperation is easier (Kolstad, 2005).
Proposition 2. If a TSO, in addition to procurement costs, also cares about social
welfare in its zone, the lump sum transfer needed for cooperation is lower: If α > 0,
y∗ < x∗.
Proof. If α > 0, y∗ < x∗ ⇔ ∆SW2−∆SW12 < x∗, where ∆SW2−∆SW12 = 0.5(C −B) and
x∗ = 0.5 [((pa2 − pe)Ra2 − (pa1 − pe)Ra1)] = 0.5(D + C + A). Therefore y∗ < x∗ ⇔
A+B +D > 0. Since areas A, B and D are positive, y∗ < x∗.
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Thus, in regions without an obligation to cooperate, cost-reducing cross-border
cooperation will only materialize if all TSOs reap the benefits of cooperation. This
can be ensured with side payments, which can be both the explicit value of our
analysis (as in the inter-TSO compensation mechanism) or more implicitly (e.g.
distortionary import tariffs or transaction costs to join the cross-border cooperation
platform); see further discussion in the Conclusions.
5.2.3 Locally optimal reserves levels
In the case of locally optimal reserve levels, not only costs of reserves, but also
expected consumer interruption costs will change. Hence, the feasibility of a bar-
gaining solution and side payments will be affected. Basic insights, however, remain
the same as in the previous case.
5.3 Reserves sharing
As in the case of reserves exchange there are, in general, distributional consequences
of reserves sharing that may make one zone better off and the other worse off, both
as regards procurement costs and expected interruptions.30 Similar to reserves
exchange, incentive compatibility of sharing requires a minimal side payment from
the zone that gains the most to the one that is worse off and a bargaining outcome
can be predicted using the Nash bargaining solution. If there is sufficiently low
correlation in reserve needs between the two zones, it is, however, possible that the
gains from lower interruption costs due to integration outweigh any rise in reserves
procurement costs. An extreme example of this is when the two zones have perfectly
negatively correlated reserve needs. In this case reserve sharing eliminates any needs
for reserve procurement! This is, however, unlikely to be the case in real situations.
30With reserves sharing, assigning procurement costs to TSOs is ambiguous since the decrease
depends on the correlation of reserve needs between the TSO zones. In addition, expected in-
terruption costs in each TSO zone depend on how interruptions are shared. For example, if
interruptions are shared in equal proportions, the distribution of expected interruption cost is
different than if the reserves-providing TSO has priority over the reserves-receiving TSO.
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6 Conclusions
This paper compares three degrees of TSO cooperation in generation reserves pro-
vision: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. We derive analytically the
optimal procurement of reserves in each of the three cases and show that costs
decrease with cooperation. The benefits of reserves exchange and reserves sharing
depend on cost asymmetry and correlation of real-time imbalance variability be-
tween cooperating TSO zones. That is, when TSO zones have highly asymmetric
reserve procurement costs but highly correlated reserve needs, reserves exchange
already yields a high cost reduction. When TSO zones have fairly equal reserve
procurement costs but a low degree of reserve needs correlation, reserves sharing is
needed to reap the full benefits of TSO reserves cooperation.
Based on actual 2015-2016 market data of reserves procurement of positive and
negative automatic frequency restoration reserves in Belgium, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, we estimate the efficiency gains of exchange and
sharing for different subsets of these countries. Cross-border cooperation in these
six countries leads to around e160 million per year for exchange and around e300
million per year for sharing. In the CWE area, the gains are respectively around
e117 and e310 million per year.
Our analysis shows that cross-border reserves cooperation has distributional
impacts on TSOs; some TSOs may even experience an increase of procurement
costs. This can be a factor hindering cooperation of TSOs on cross-border reserves
procurement and balancing and thus prevent potential efficiency gains from being
realised31. In general, the extent of the disincentives created by such distributional
impacts will depend on the market mechanisms in place in different areas as well as
on the weight TSOs place on social welfare, rather than their own costs; cooperation
31This is perhaps illustrated by the elimination of an obligation to cooperate on balancing and
reserves procurement, initially included in the proposed Electricity Balancing Guideline (?), but
now dropped in the recently adopted guideline (?).
40
will be easier when TSOs place a weight on social welfare in their zone. This
underscores the importance of careful design of regulation and mechanisms for trade,
as well as for redistribution of efficiency gains. We illustrate, in the context of a
particular market mechanism (uniform price auctions), how side payments can be
used to induce cooperation. Full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper, but is, however, an important area for further research.
In this paper we focused on the changes of procurement and interruption costs
generated by more efficient supply. The true benefits of cross-border cooperation
can be higher than presented in our model because of improved market liquidity,
internalisation of external effects, and increased market access through standard-
ization of rules and products. In addition, TSOs that are first to cooperate can
define the rules and standards of cooperation and have therefore lower transaction
and compliance costs.
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